TRACY vs. ATHERTON ET AL.
willingness to bear their proper share of the taxation necessary for the preservation of our Union and Constitution, therefore
It is enacted by the General Assembly as follows.:
So much of the act entitled "An act for the establishment of a college or university within this colony," passed at February session, A. D. 1764, as exempts the
estates, persons and families of the President and Professors of said institution,
now known as Brown University, from taxation, is hereby repealed.
NOTE.-It will be seen that this bill does not affect at all the college property,
but only that of the college officers. Even on the ground of contract it can be
hardly supposed that the exemption of the officers was one of the essentials of the
charter, without which the college would not have accepted it.

In the Supreme Court of Vermont-January Term for Oittenden
County 1862.
JOHN W. TRACY VS. ALONZO ATHERTON et al.
A right of way cannot arise from mere necessity, independent of any grant or
reservation, express, or implied as in the case of a former unity of ownership.

This was an action of trespass qu. el. The defendants pleaded
in justification a right of way of nece8sity from the close occupied
by them, over the plaintiff's close, to the public highway; the
plaintiff's close lying between theirs and said highway; averring
that at none of the said several times when, &c., could the defendants have access to their said close from said highway, or egress
from their said close, to said highway, or to any other highway or
public place, except over and across the close of the plaintiff,
without going a greater and more inconvenient and an unnecessary
distance, and over and across the closes of other persons; and
therefore, that the defendants had, at said several times, when, &c.,
a necessary way for themselves, &c., and alleging the trespasses
complained of to be the passing and repassing of the defendants
upon said necessary way, as they lawfully might, &c. There was
no averment of any former unity of ownership or possession of
said closes, nor of any right by prescription. The plea was answered by a general demurrer. The county court, pro forma, ad-
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judged the plea sufficient. To this exception was taken, and the
case carried thereon to the Supreme Court.
The case was argued by A. L. Bennett, for plaintiff, and C. F.
Edmunds, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARRETT, J.-The plea justifies the alleged trespass, on the
ground of a right in the defendants of a way of necessity, a right
created by the necessity, and in no manner derived from grant, reservation, or prescription. The cases are numerous in which a
way of necessity, as it is called, has been upheld; but in most instances, it has been on the ground of ' grant or reservation implied
from the necessity. There are some cases in which the reason
assigned for the decision seems to favor the idea that a right of
way may be created by the necessity, irrespective and independent
of any grant or reservation, either express or implied. The one
most directly to this effect is Dutton vs. Taylor, 2 Lutw. 1487.
That case, in its facts, falls within the principle announced by the
Court in deciding Clark vs. Cogge, Cro. Jac. 170, viz.: cc If a
man hath four closes lying together, and sells three of them, reserving the middle close, and hath not any way thereto but throughone of those which he sold, although he reserved not any way, yet
shall he have it, as reserved unto him by the law." The case of
Chichester vs. Lethbridge, Willes Rep. 71, cited by counsel for the
defendants, does not sustain the doctrine involved in the reason
assigned for the decision in .Dutton vs. Taylor, viz. : "cthat the
public good required that the land should not be unoccupied." -It
was, under the 2d count, which alone was sustained, a case of
prescription,in which the necessity was needlessly alleged as showing'the origin of the user that had ripened into a right by prescription.
The case of Clark vs. Cogge, supra, which was also cited by defendants' counsel, was the ordinary one of an implied grant of a
way. fowton vs. Frearson, 8 T. R. 50, was put on the same
ground by Ld. KENYON, though counsel uiged the right, upon the
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principle and authority of Dutton vs. Taylor. The ground on
which the decision in ffowton vs. Frearsonwas put, in connection
with the remarks of Ld. KENYON, casts a cloud upon the soundness, if not upon the authority, of the decision for the reason
assigned in 1Jutton vs. Taylor. He says, " even upon the general
ground, I was prepared to submit to the express authority of the
case in Lutwich, though I cannot say that my reason has been
convinced by it. There are great difficulties in the question ; but
in the other mode of considering the case" (viz.: as an implied
grant), "those difficulties are gotten rid of altogether, and it falls
within all the authorities, which are not controverted, even by the
plaintiff."
In 1 Saund. 323 a, note 6, the cases are collated, and the doctrine educed is, that a way of necessity, such as the law recognises,
results either from a grant or reservation, implied from the existing necessity, and that unity of possession at some former time
appears to be the foundation of the right.
In Bullard vs. .Harrison,4 M. & S. 887, the third plea was, in
substance, the same as the one now under consideration; and after
full argument, Lord ELLENBOROUGH, with some spirit and great
point, says: "Then as to this being well pleaded as a way of
necessity, it is pleaded without showing any unity of possession
or prescription whereby the land over which the way is claimed
became chargeable. * * * It seems to suppose that whenever a
man has not another way, he has a right to go over his neighbor's
close. But this is not so," &c. He then refers to note 6 in
Saunders 323 a, as containing the law of the subject and manner
of pleading a way of necessity very accurately detailed; and saying , it is a thing of grant," &c.
In Proctor vs. ffodgson, 29 E. L. & E. 453, in the Court of
Exchequer, the subject is involved and discussed; and the doctrine
in the note on 1 Saunders 323 a, and as held by Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Bullard vs. Harrison, is asserted and applied by the
Court. The same view of the law is explicitly stated in Woolrych
on the Law of Ways, 72 note q., as well as in Gale & Whatley
on Easements, upon a review of all the cases, p. 53 et seq. See
also Woolrych, pp. 20-21.

TRACY vs. ATHERTON ET AL.

The doubt expressed in Hammond's N. P. 198, as to the doctrine of that note in Saunders, would seem to be quieted by the
authorities above cited.
Whatever may be the tendency of some of the cases, including
that of -Dutton vs. Taylor, the review we have given shows that
the law of the subject is, for the present, settled in England.
So far as we have been referred to, or have been able to examine
cases in this country, they seem to be uniform in holding or countenancing the doctrine that now prevails in England. In Michols
vs. Luce, 24 Pick. 102, the subject was fully discussed, and the
cases were reviewed by counsel, and in the opinion of the Court
delivered by MOrTON, J., who says, - The deed of the grantor as
much creates the way of necessity, as it does the way by grant.
The only difference between the two is, that one is granted by
express words, and the other only by implication. * * * It is not
the necessity which creates the right of way, but the fair construction of the acts of the parties. No necessity will justify an entry
on another's land," &c.
, In Collins vs. Prentiss,15 Conn. 39, the subject was thoroughly
considered, and the leading cases were cited. WAITE, J., states
the law, in substance, as it is stated in the note in Saunders, cited
supra, and remarks, " And although it is called a way of necessity,
yet in strictness the necessity does not create the way, but merely
furnishes evidence as to the real intention of the parties." The
same case came before the court again, and is reported 15 Conn.
423. The Court say, " A way of necessity can only be created
in laitds owned by the grantor at the time of the conveyance, and
must be either reserved in the lands conveyed, for the benefit of
the grantor, or created in other lands of the grantor for the benefit
of the grantee. It arises from a fair, construction of the deed as
to the presumed intent of the parties. And it affects nobody but
the parties to the deed and those claiming under them."
In Seeley vs. Bishop, 19 Conn. 134, ELLSWORTH, J., says, " In
the case of Collins vs. Prentiss, 15 Conn. 89, this Court recognised fully, and to as great an extent as any other court, the doctrine of a way of necessity." The case of Pierce vs. Selleck, 18
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Conn. 321, cited by defendants' counsel, does not present any
view of the law different -from, or in any way modifying the doctrine stated and held in Collins vs. Prentiss. In Brice vs. Bandall, 7 Gill & Johns. 349, it is held that the fact that a person has
no right of way except over the defendant's land, is not, of itself,
sufficient to give him a right of way from necessity.
Chancellor Kent, 3 Com. 423-4, after referring to various English cases, states the doctrine contained in Sergeant Williams'
,note, cited supra, and says, " This would be placing the right upon
a reasonable foundation and one consistent with the general principles of the law :" 3 Cruise Dig. 87. In a learned note by Professor
Greenleaf, it is said, "But necessity alone, without reference to
any relations between the respective owners of the land, is not
sufficient to create this right." He then cites Bullard vs. .arrison,
Sergeant Williams' note, Woolrych on Ways, and Kent's Com.,
as they are cited supra.
From this reference to the American cases and books, it appears
that the law of the subject as now held in England, is received
and adopted in this country to a sufficient extent to warrant the
Court in adopting the same doctrine, so far as it is applicable, in
this case. Indeed, if the question were now resting in general
principles, unaffected by the discussions and decisions to which
reference has been made, we should be very slow to hold that the
necessity of a landowner, for a convenient way to and from his
land, would create in him the right to encumber the land of a
contiguous owner with the servitude of such way, independently
of some former unity of ownership of the two parcels, a~d the
implication of a grant or reservation of such right, and independently of any right established by prescription.
If this right, as claimed by the defendants in this case, were
tp be put on the ground of the requirements of the public good,
as was done in assigning the reason for the decision in Dutton vs.
Taylor, it might with propriety be suggested, whether the constitutional provision as to taking private property for public use
without compensation, would not challenge consideration as a conclusive objection to the claim.
The provisions of the Statute for pent or bridle roads, seem to
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have been made to answer to all the real necessities for a way,
such as is claimed to be needed in this case, and at the same time
to yield a due regard to the principle and spirit, as well as to the
letter of that provision of the constitution.
On the whole, we are satisfied that the plea cannot be sustained
either upon principle or authority.
The judgment is therefore reversed.
We are indebted to the courtesy of into an examination of the cases upon
Mr. Justice BARRETT. for the foregoing that point, that we should scarcely feel
very satisfactory opinion upon the ques- justified in occupying any more space.
I.F.R.
tion of "right of way of necessity."
The learned judge has gone so thoroughly

In the Supreme Court of Iowa.
TRUSTEES OF IOWA COLLEGE VS. RICHARD B. HILL.
Where L. executed and delivered to H. four blank 'promissory notes, and authorized him to fill the blanks with sums not exceeding $5000 each, for the purpose
of negotiating them for the benefit of L.; and H. delivered to L. similar notes,
to serve as receipts, or to indemnify him in case he (H.) should misuse any of
the funds arising from the negotiation of L.'s notes; and H. returned the notes
executed by L. to him with the blanks unfilled; and one of the notes executed
by H. was filled by L. with the sum of $8629.81, and passed to the plaintiffs by
indorsement as collateral security for an antecedent debt, it was held, that the
court did not err in instructing the jury:
1. That the onus of showing the consideration of the note was upon the maker, the
presumption being that it was sufficient.
2. That if the indorsees were ond fide holders for a good consideration, it could
make no difference that it was executed in blank, or that it was accommodation
paper which had been misused by the indorser.
8. That if the transaction was an exchange of notes, the indorsee could not be
defeated by showing that, subsequent to the transfer, H. had delivered up and
cancelled the notes of the indorser.
4. That if H.'s notes were delivered merely to stand as receipts to protect L. in
case H. should misuse the funds arising from the notes given to him to negotiate,
any note filled up by L. (his notes having been returned to him) would in his
hands be without consideration.
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5. That the presumption was that the indorsee took the note in good faith, in the
usual course of business, before its maturity, and for a valuable consideration;
that express or actual notice that the note was without consideration, or that
it had been filled up without authority, was not necessary; that it is sufficient if
the circumstances brought home to the plaintiffs are of such a strong and
pointed character .as necessarily to cast a shade upon the transaction and put
them upon inquiry; that the indorsees are not charged with notice because of
any want of diligence on their part in making inquiry, or if they took the note
under suspicious circumstances, provided they had no notice actual or constructive of the equities between the original parties; that the defendant was not
bound to prove that the plaintiff purchased with full and certain knowledge of
the want of consideration, but if the circumstances attending the transfer of the
note were such as to put them on their guard, or if they must have known therefrom that the person offering it had no right to transfer it, then they were bound
to make inquiry, and if they did not, they took the note at their peril.
6. That though the plaintiffs took the note as collateral security for an antecedent
debt, they are nevertheless prim0facie, though not conclusively, to be considered
as holders for value, and it is on the defendant to show that they are not such
holders; that if it was taken for collateral security only, the plaintiffs parting
with nothing, giving no time, relinquishing no right, nor suffering damages
or injury as the consideration or in consequence of receiving it, they would not
be such holders.

Appeal from SRott County District Court.

James Grant,S. F. Smith, and F. F. Burlock, for the appellant.
Davison

True and James J. Lindley, for the appellee.

WRIGHT, J.-This case has been very fully argued by counsel:
seldom have we found one more so. We have examined it with
great care, and now proceed to state our conclusions without much
elaboration of the points made.
Three questions of fact, under the instructions of the Court,
were presented for the determination of the jury : 1st. Was the
note obtained without consideration? 2d. Had the plaintiffs
notice of this before taking the same ? 3d. If they had not this
notice, did they take it for value in the due course of trade ? It
is manifest that the jury must have found for the defendant upon
the first question; for this determined in favor of the plaintiffs
would have entitled them to a verdict. It is equally clear that
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their finding must have been in favor of the defendant upon one
or both of the other issues. The first, and either of the others,
if decided in favor of the defendant, entitled him to a verdict.
Whereas, a contrary result as to the first, or that found for the
defendant, and the other two against him, would have compelled
a verdict for plaintiffs.
What was the consideration, then, was the first material inquiry.
Briefly, the defendant claims that at the time the note was given,
he, a resident of Davenport, was about to visit Boston ; that
Lambrite called upon him, and left four blank notes signed by
said Lambrite, which defendint had the privilege of filling up, in
sums not to exceed $5000 each, for the purpose of negotiating
the same in Boston for the benefit of said Lambrite; that after
the notes were thus signed and delivered, the defendant, at his
own instance, handed to Lambrite four similar blank notes, including the one now in suit, to serve as a receipt or to indemnify him
in case the defendant should misuse any of the funds that might
be raised on Lambrite's notes; that he never used the notes
obtained from Lambrite, but on the contrary returned the same
to him, without ever having filled them up ; that Lambrite filled
up one of the notes thus signed by the defendant, with the sum
of $8629.81, and passed the same to the plaintiffs. On the part
of the plaintiffs, it is claimed that the transaction was an exchange
of notes, each party having the right to fill up and negotiate the
paper thus delivered, and thus raise money for himself. To support these respective claims, the parties introduced a very great
amount of testimony, after considering all of which, the jury
found for the defendant. And to sustain this finding, we think
the testimony is most abundant. That it was ever intended by
the parties that Lambrite should use the blanks delivered to him,
except to indemnify himself should the contingency arise, we do
not for one moment believe. We are equally clear that Lambrite
never intended to thus use them,'and that he only concluded in
an evil hour to thus use the defendant's name, to do what was
at most but partial justice to the plaintiffs, whose funds, which
had come into his hands as treasurer, he had used, and which he
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hoped to be able to replace, and redeem the note without the
negotiation being known to Hill. Nor do we think any just
exception can be taken to the instructions on this subject. The
onus was on the defendant. The presumption was that the consideration was right in every particular, and it was incumbent on
the defendant to rebut this .presumption. If the plaintiffs were
bond fide holders for value, then it could make no difference that
the note was signed in blank; nor that it was' accommodation
paper merely, and had been misused by Lambrite. If the transaction was an exchange of notes, then so far the plaintiffs could
not be defeated by showing that subsequent to the transfer, the
defendant had delivered up and cancelled the notes of Lambrite.
If, however, the notes of Hill were delivered not as accommodation
paper, but merely to answer in the place of a receipt or receipts,
or to protect Lambrite in case Hill should misuse the funds arising
from the notes delivered to him to negotiate, any note filled up
by Lambrite (his notes not having been used) would in his hands
be without consideration. All this was stated to the jury, and
substantially and correctly covered the whole law of the case
touching the question of consideration. Nor was there any error
in refusing those asked by the plaintiffs upon the same subject.
In the first place, so far as applicable, they were covered by the
instructions in chief. In the next place, while some of those asked
and refused, as abstract propositions, were good law, the giving
of them could have answered no good purpose under the testimony submitted. We take occasion to say what we have frequently
repeated-that a court is not bound to repeat an instruction previously given. Nor should an instruction be given, which, though
abstractly correct, is not pertinent to the actual facts developed on
the trial.
II. Did the plaintiffs take the note with notice? With the question of fact here involved we have nothing to do, more than to
say that if the jury found in the affirmative, we should entertain
very many doubts of the correctness of the verdict. As the discussion of this question, however, will be immaterial, from the
final view we shall take of the case, we shall confine ourselves to
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the law governing it as given by the Court. The jury were told
that the presumption was that the plaintiffs took the note in good
faith, in the usual course of business, before its maturity, and for
a valuable consideration; that express or actual notice that the
note was without consideration, or that it had been filled up without authority, was not necessary; that it was sufficient if the circumstances brought home to the plaintiffs were of such a strong
and pointed character as necessarily to cast a shade upon the
transaction, and put them upon inquiry.. They are not to be
charged with notice because of any want of diligence on their part
in making inquiry, or even if they took the note under suspicious
circumstances, provided they had no notice, actual or constructive,
of the alleged equities existing betwe.en Lambrite and Hill. That
the defendant was not bound to prove that the- plaintiffs purchased
with full and certain knowledge of the want of consideration, but
if the circumstances attending the transfer of the note were such
as to put them on their guard, or if they must have known therefrom that the person offering it had no right to transfer it, then
they were bound to make inquiry, and if they did not, they took
the note at their peril. Other instructions bearing upon this question, referring more in detail to the facts developed, were given,
but the foregoing will serve to show the general view of the law,
taken by the Judge trying the cause. To these we do not think
the plaintiffs can have any just ground of exception. As sustaining them, see KYelly vs. Ford, 4 Iowa 140; Clapp vs. Cedar County,
5 Id. 58 ; Story on Notes, § 197 ; Cole vs. Baldwin, 12 Pick. 546.
In this connection the appellants insist that certain instructions
were erroneous, for the reason that they were based upon a state
of facts of which there was no testimony. We recognise fully the
rule that it is erroneous to instruct upon a hypothetical state of
facts of which there was no evidence: Moffitt vs. Crumbe, 8 Iowa
122; United States vs. Brentling, 20 How. 252. But the rule has
no application in this case, for the reason that in one instance the
instruction was clearly applicable, and as to the other the appellant clearly mistakes the language used by the Court. Thus we
should be very far from holding that there was no testimony as to
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Lambrite's insolvency at the time of the transfer. On the contrary, we think they would have been fully justified in finding him
notoriously so. This is certainly the impression the testimony
makes upon our minds. And then, as to the other instruction,
the objection is, that the jury were told that notice to one agent
Is notice to another, whereas, the instruction given is, that notice
to the agent of matters coming within the purview of his agency
was notice to the principal. In this part of the case, therefore,
there was no error in the action of the Court.
III. The question of most importance, and that most discussed
by counsel, arises under the third branch of the case. As already
suggested, it is claimed by defendant, and the evidence tends to
prove, that the plaintiffs received this note from Lambrite as collateral to secure a pre-existing indebtedness, and upon this subject
the Court instructed that though the plaintiffs took the note as
collateral security for an antecedent debt, they were nevertheless
primdfacie, though not conclusively, to be considered holders for
value, and it is on the defendant to show that they were not such
holders. Other instructions on the same point were given, and
some asked by the parties refused, which, however, need not be
recited, for if the foregoing is law, it in our view renders the consideration of all the others unimportant, and the same is true if
it is not the law.
Two propositions are said, by Justice STORY, to be laid up
among the fundamentals of the law, and to require no authority
or reasoning to support them. The first is, that a bond fide holder
of a negotiable instrument for a valuable consideration, without
notice of facts which imperil its validity as between antecedent
parties, if he takes it by indorsement before the same becomes
due, holds the title unaffected by these facts, and may recover
thereon, although as between the antecedent parties the transaction may be without any legal validity. The second is, that the
holder of negotiable paper taken before it is due, is not bound to
prove that he is a bond fide holder for a valuable consideration
without notice, for the law will so presume in the absence of all
rebutting proofs, and therefore it is incumbent on the defendant
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to overcome, by satisfactory proofs, the prirnd facie title of the
plaintiff: Swift vs. Tyson, 16 Peters 1. But, as applied to this
case, the question remains, What constitutes a valuable consideration, under the general rule applicable to negotiable instruments ?
It was held in this Court, in Johnson vs. Baury, 1 Iowa 531,
as settled .by the current of decisions, that the rights of the holder
of negotiable paper are the same, whether ihe debt for which it
is transferred is pre-existing or contracted at the time. This, of
course, referred to a case where the instrument was taken in satisfaction or payment of a pre-existing debt; for, by reference to
the case, it will be found that while the question of the rights of
a holder who takes the paper as collateral security on a previous
liability was discussed by counsel, it was not decided, as the case
was disposed of on another point. At that time, however, the
question was very elaborately discussed by able counsel, and the
writer of this opinion, who is the only member of the present
bench who heard the argument, concurred with those authorities
which held in accordance with the instructions given in this case.
He has serious reason to change the view then entertained, and
this being the opinion of the other members of the Court, is so
held. Authorities upon the subject are to be found, perhaps, in
every state in the Union except our own, to say nothing of the
adjudications in the Federal Courts, and those of England.
The most casual reader must be struck with the number of times
the question has been determined without really arising. If the
evils resulting from an indulgence in mere obiter dicta were ever
apparent, they are peculiarly so in this instance.
Taking it for granted that taking the note in payment, and as
collateral security merely, were the same in principle as affecting
the rights of the assignee, cases of the first character are decided,
and there it is announced, without the least necessity or occasion
*for it, that the same rule applies to the second. And well might
Justice CATRON, in the leading case of Swift vs. Tyson, supra, say
that what is incorporated in the principal opinion on this subject
was aside from the case made by the record, or argued by counsel.
The same thing occurs in effect in Bond vs. Central Bank, 2
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Kelley 106, and based upon the reasoning there used to a great
extent. NESBIT, J., decided the case of Gibson vs. Conver, 3 Id.
47. So in Allaine vs. .Hartshorne, 1 Zab. 665.
The note was transferred for a consideration then advanced in
part, and though the question as applied to collaterals did not
arise, it was discussed and decided. The case in 11 Ohio 172 is
clearly one of payment, and all that is said about collaterals is
obiter, and nothing else. So, again, the case of Blanchardvs.
Stevens, 3 Cush. 162, required nothing more than the recognition
of the principle that the receiving of the note in payment of a
pre-existing debt will exclude all equities between the' original
parties, and thus we might in almost numberless cases show the
truth of the general remark above made. But these will suffice.
Some cases are found where the question under discussion fairly
and legitimately arose, and was decided as claimed by the appellants. Of this character is the case of 3 Kelley, supra (but
see Afealon vs. Bird, 22 Georgia 246), Bank vs. Carrington, 5 R.
1. 515, and some others, referred to by counsel. The case of
Bank vs. Chapin, 8 Mete. 40, does not, in its facts, come clearly
within the rule. The debt for which the note in suit was pledged
was not a pre-existing debt.
But, without further reference to these cases, we conclude that
the correct rule is found clearly stated in Roxborough vs. .eesick,
6 Ohio St. R. 448, thus: "cWhere the note is transferred as collateral security, and for value such as a loan or further advancement, or a stipulation, express or implied, of further time to pay
a pre-existing debt, or the like, the assignee will be protected from
infirmities affecting the instrument before it was thus transferred.
If, however, the note is transferred as collateral security to a preexisting debt, without any consideration, so that the transfer is a
mere voluntary act on the part of the debtor, and is received by
the creditor without incurring any new responsibility, parting with
any right, or subjecting himself to any delay or loss, and leaving
the subsisting debt precisely in the condition it was before such
transfer, the holder has not taken the note for value, nor in the
usual course of trade." "cTo hold otherwise," says Judge SWAN,
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in .that case, " would be a departure from the established rules of
law, governing the rights of parties to negotiable paper, and losing
sight of public policy, upon which the law is founded."
And the annotator's note to Swift vs. Tyson, 1 Am. Lead. Cases
336, states this rule substantially as one that may be considered
as settled, and to support it refers to cases in Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Kentucky, Illinois, Alabama, Michigan, and Delaware.
Affirmed.
Where an instrument in the general a blank before the true amount, and a
form of a bill of exchange or promissory greater sum is fraudulently filled in by
note, but with a blank for the amount the holder, as three hundred and fifty for
to be paid, is delivered by the apparent fifty, the maker was liable for the
drawer or maker to the payee or other greater sum. This case has been a good
person, with authority to negotiate it deal commented on, but seems, to the
after filling the blank up to a certain actual extent of the decision, to be folsum, it becomes, when so filled up, a lowed in England. See Robarts vs.
valid note or bill by relation, and it will Tucker, 16 Q. B. 560; Bank of Ireland
bind the maker in the hands of a bond vs. Trustees, &c., 5 H. Lds. 410; Ey
fide holder for value, though a greater parte Swan, 7 Com. B. 400. But in
than the stipulated sum has been fraudu- Worrall vs. Gheen, 3 Wright 388, it was
lently inserted. The same rule applies held that Young vs. Grote, if it could be
to the indorser of a note in blank. Rus- supported at all, was not applicable to
sell vs. Langstaffe, 2 Douglas 514; bills of exchange or promissory notes,
Colls vs. Emett, 1 H. Black. 313; and therefore that where a note was inYoung vs. Grote, 4 Bingh. 257; Robarts dorsed for the accommodation of the
vs. Tucker, 16 Q. B. 560; Russell vs. maker, who fraudulently filled up a
Perkins, 25 L. J., C. P. 187; Bank of blank space before the real sum, so as
Ireland vs. Trustees of Evans' Charity, to increase the amount, the indorser was
5 H. Lds. Cas. 410; Violett vs. Patton, not liable even to a bond fide holder for
5 Crauch 142; Putnam vs. Sullivan, 4 more than the original sum. And this
Mass. 45; Mitchell vs. Culver, 7 Cow. is also the effect of the decision in Ives
337; Moody vs. Threkeld, 13 Geo. 55; vs. Farmers' Bank, 2 Allen 241.
Bank of Limestone vs. Penick, 5 Monr.
The other question raised in the fore25; Bank of Commonwealth vs. Curry, going case, as to whether one who takes
2 Dana 142; Smith vs. Moberly, 10 B. a bill or note as collateral security for
Monroe 266; Huntington vs. Branch an antecedent debt is a holder for value,
Bank, 3 Ala. 186; Kimber vs. Lytle, 10 which has been much discussed in the
Yerg. 417; Young vs. Ward, 21 Illinois United States, and on which the autho223; Ives vs. Farmers' Bank, 2 Allen, rities are greatly at variance, is conMass. 241. In Young vs. Grote, 4 Bing. sidered at length in the note to Le
257, this doctrine was carried so far that Breton vs. Pierce, in this volume, p. 35,
it was held that where an agent autho- and in that to Swift vs. Tyson, 16 Pet.
rized to fill up a check to a certain 1, in 1 Am. Leading Cases 333. See
amount, does it so carelessly as to leave also Atkinson vs. Brooks, 26 Verm. 378;
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Bank of Republic vs. Carrington, 5 R.
I. 519; Roxborough vs. Messick, 6 Ohio,
N S. 448, in which the subject is discussed with great learning and ability.
In addition to the cases referred to in
our previous note, and in the foregoing
opinion, in support of the dictum of
Judge STonY in Swift vs. Tyson, may be
cited the more recent decisions of
Bridgeport Bank vs. Welch, 29 Conn.
476; Auston vs. Curtis, 31 Verm. 64,
semb.; and against it, Prentiss vs. Graves,
33 Barb. 622; Farrington vs. Frankfort
Bank, 31 Id. 188; Lea vs. Smead, 1
Mete. Ky. 628; Alexander vs. Springfield Bank, 2 Id. 534. In Davis vs.
Miller, 14 Gratt. 1, the question was left
undecided.
While the courts of Pennsylvania and
New York bold, beyond doubt, that one
who takes a note merely as collateral

security for an antecedent debt is not a
holder for value, and is therefore not
-protected when the note has got into
circulation by fraud or in violation of
some agreement (Kirkpatrick vs. Muirhead, 16 Penn. St. 381; Prentiss vs.
Graves, 33 Barb. 622), yet they have
also held latterly that an accommodation maker or indorser cannot depend,
in a suit on the note, on the ground of
want of consideration alone. Appleton
vs. Donaldson, 3 Penn. St. 381; Lord
vs. Ocean Bank, 20 Id. 386; Moore vs.
Baird, 30 Id. 138; Work vs. Kase, 34
Id. 140; Zeng vs. Fyfe, 1 Bosworth 335;
Robbins vs. Richardson, 2 Id. 248. The
reason assigned for this distinction is
that accommodation paper is a mere
loan of credit, without restriction as to
the manner of its use.
H. W.

New Jersey Supreme Court, June Term 1862.
THE STATE VS.

BABCOCK & BABCOCK.

By the compact between the States of New Jersey and New York, approved by
Congress in the year 1834, the State of New York has exclusive jurisdiction
over all the waters of the Hudson River, and of and over the lands covered by
the said waters, to the low-water mark on the Now Jersey shore. On an indictment in New Jersey for obstructing the free navigation of the said river, by
placing, sinking, and lodging in the said river certain ships, schooners, boats,
and other vessels, the jury rendered a general verdict of guilty, but found as a
fact that the defendants had, within the times specified in the indictment, placed
and procured to be placed vessels and wrecks of vessels both above and below
the low-water line, which were an interruption to the navigation. A new trial
was granted.
Observations on the nature and ground of the compact between the States.

This case came before the court upon a special state of the case
made on the trial, accompanying a general verdict of guilty. The
indictment was originally found in the Court of Oyer and Terminer
of the county of Hudson, which, being removed into the Supreme
Court by certiorari,was taken down for trial at the Hudson Circuit.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
48
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ELMER, J.-By the compact between the States of New Jersey
and New York, ratified by the legislatures of the two States, and
approved by Congress, in the year 1834, the State of New York
has exclusive jurisdiction of and over all the waters of Hudson
river, and of and over the lands covered by the said waters, to the
low-water mark on the New Jersey shore; and the State of New
Jersey has the exclusive right of property in and to the land
under the water lying west of the middle of the river, and exclusive jurisdiction of and over the wharves, docks, and improvements
made or to be made on the Jersey shore, and on vessels aground
on said shore, or fastened to any such wharf or dock, except as
to quarantine regulations and the exclusive right of regulating
the fisheries on the westerly side of the middle of the river. The
waters of the Hudson, although exclusively within the jurisdiction
of New York, are a common highway for all the citizens of the
United States. Any obstruction to that highway, placed on the
shore above the low-water mark, which shore remains exclusively
within the jurisdiction of New Jersey, either by means of vessels,
logs, stones, or other temporary obstructions placed there, or by
means of a wharf or other improvements, which are injurious to
the navigation, is of course indictable in this state; while obstructions below the low-water mark, where not only the water, but the
land under the water, are exclusively, except as to the fisheries,
within the jurisdiction of New York, can only be punished by
proceedings in the courts of that state, or of the United States.
If by docks as used in the compact, is meant, as I suppose, according to the American usage, the spaces between wharves, the
.land covered by the water within such docks is also within the
jurisdiction of this state, and obstructions placed therein which
are injurious to the navigation, may be indicted in our courts.
The indictment in the case before us, charges that the defendants obstructed the free navigation of the river, by placing, sinking, and lodging in said river, and upon the shore of this state, in
said river, certain ships, schooners, boats, and other vessels; and
it is found as a fact by the jury, according to the special case
returned to us with a general verdict of guilty, that the defendants
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had within the times specified in the indictment, placed and procured to be placed, vessels and wrecks of vessels both above and
below the low-water line, which were an interruption to the free
navigation of the river. Other facts are also found by the jury,
which perhaps were meant to show that obstructions were placed
in a dock; but the indictment does not charge that any obstructions were placed in a dock, nor do the facts stated enable us
judicially to determine that such was the case. What is a dock,
I suppose, is a mixed question of fact and law.
Had the special case explicitly stated that the obstructions
placed on the shore, that is on the land covered by the tide between
the high and low water lines, were obstructions to the navigation
of the river, and did it sufficiently appear that the two defendants
bad acted jointly in placing and keeping them there, I should be
of opinion that judgment ought to be pronounced for the State.
As the case appears, it will be the only safe course to send down
the case for a new trial, that these two questions may be distinctly
submitted to the jury.
It has been earnestly insisted that the safety of property holders
on the Jersey shore requires us to hold that obstructions in the
river, outside of the low-water line, if injurious to the navigation
of vessels coming to that shore, are offences against our laws, and
indictable in our courts. But apprehensions of this kind, which
are probably altogether imaginary, will not justify us in departing
from the plain meaning of the compact. Although for some purposes New Jersey is bounded by the middle of the Hudson, and
the state owns the land under the water to that extent, exclusive
jurisdiction not only over the water, but over the land to the low.
water line on the Jersey shore, is, in plain and unmistakeable
language, granted to, or rather acknowledged to belong to, the
State of New York. There is no reason to doubt that the tribunals
of that state, which have a common interest in preventing all
obstructions to the navigation of the waters surrounding their
most important city, will not only punish all crimes against our
citizens or their own, while in or upon those waters, but will also
adequately punish all interference with the navigation. The case
does not materially differ from a line between two states,, on the
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land which happens to be the scene of a busy population, where a
manufactory near to that line in one state, may be a nuisance to
the citizens of the other, whose redress will have to be obtained
from the tribunals of the state in which the nuisance is situate.
As persons not acquainted wkh the circumstances of the dispute
between the States of New Jersey and New York, in regard to the
respective rights in the river and bay separating them, have sometimes complained of the compact agreed upon after a long and
troublesome controversy, and after the failure of two previous attempts to terminate it by agreement, as having conceded too much
to New York, it may be proper to take this opportunity of explaining the obvious motives which induced the commissioners and
the legislature of this State to consent to the terms finally adopted.
The territories now forming the States of New York and New
Jersey, including by name Hudson's river, were granted originally
by King Charles the Second to his brother, the Duke of New York,
afterwards James the Second. The Duke granted to Lord Berkley
and Sir George Carteret, the territory now the State of New
Jersey, and described it as " all that tract of land adjacent to New
England, and being to the westward of Long Island and Manhitas
Island, and bounded on the east part by the main sea and part by
Hudson river, and hath upon the west Delaware bay or river."
Between the date of this grant and the Revolution, the charters
of New York city, and the proceedings of its authorities, showed
that it had always been claimed that the whole of Hudson's river,
up to the low-water mark on the westerly shore, belonged to that
State. After the Declaration of Independence, it was claimed by
New Jersey that the conquest from the crown extended that State
to the middle of the river. These conflicting claims led to the
appointment of commissioners by the two States to settle the conflicting claims in 1807, and again in 1827, without success.
In the meantime Judge WASHINGTON had decided that the grant
to New Jersey limited its territory to theeastern shore of the Delaware river and bay, a decision acknowledged by this Court to ba
correct. State vs. Davi8, 1 Dutch 386. And what was still more
adverse to the claim of this State, in reference to the waters of the
Hudson, the Supreme Court of the United States laid down the
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doctrine that " when a great river is the boundary between two
nations or States, if the original property is in neither, and there
be 'no convention respecting it, each holds to the middle of the
stream. But when, as in this case, one State is the original proprietor, and grants the territory on one side only, it retains the
river within its own domain, and the newly-created State extends
to the river only." And upon this principle they held that the
Ohio river was exclusively within the territorial limits of Kentucky,
and that Indiana had no jurisdiction over or rights to the river.
ffandly's Lessee vs. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 860.
When the Commissioners of New Jersey and New York again
met, in 1833, and it was found that those of the latter State appeared to be desirous of arranging the dispute upon fair and liberal
terms, but deemed it indispensable that their great commercial emporium should have the exclusive control of the police on the
surrounding waters, and full power to establish such quarantine
regulations as should be found necessary, the commissioners of this
state deemed it wise to secure the exclusive property in the soil to
the middle of the river, and exclusive jurisdiction over the wharves,
docks, and other improvements, made or to be made, on the Jersey
shore, and over the vessels fastened thereto, and the right to regulate the adjacent fisheries, leaving to New York what was thought
to be quite as much a burthen as a privilege, the exclusive jurisdiction over offences in or upon the water, or the land covered by
the water, outside of the low-water mark. As it was thought possible that the time might come when Perth Amboy will be an important city, like exclusive jurisdiction over the adjacent waters,
to the low-water mark on Staten Island, was secured to this State.
Nothing has since occurred to make the propriety of this arrangement doubtful; on the contrary, there is every reason to believe
that it has secured important rights to this Sta'ewhich otherwise
might have been lost.
In further elucidation of this subject, it is to be noticed that
the river Delaware was never within the jurisdiction either of this
State or Pennsylvania, until, by the Revolution, the right of the
Crown was extinguished, and each State then held to the middle.
Under these circumstances the agreement between the two States,

